

Mind Only or Ideation Only? An Examination of *Yogācāra* Philosophy and Its Chinese Interpretation

Medawachchye Dhammajothi

Yogācāra is one of the main Buddhist philosophical schools originated in India which later on, spread to China and Tibet. It emphasized the function of *Vijñāna* which was taken as negating the existence of the outside world. On account of this, *Yogācāra* tradition is known as *Vijñānavāda* or idealism. Many scholars are of the view that *Yogācāra Vijñānavāda* has been misunderstood as idealism found in the West. Professor Kalupahana is one of the first scholars to point this out. According to these scholars, this misunderstanding is found even in some of the *Yogācāra* commentaries in India. Later on, this misunderstanding spread to China and Tibet with the Chinese and Tibetan translations of Sanskrit *Yogācāra* works. Most of these *Yogācāra* works in Sanskrit, like many other Buddhist sources, have disappeared in their original form and some of them are only preserved as Chinese or Tibetan translations. When these sources were restored into Sanskrit language by modern scholars, they totally depended on these Chinese and Tibetan translations. As a result, the idea of *Yogācāra* philosophy as idealism similar to Western idealism was established and consequently, *Yogācāra* philosophy was understood as a mind only philosophy and *Yogācāra* tradition was known as the Mind only School of thought.

The aim of this paper is to examine as some modern scholars have pointed out, whether Chinese translators had misunderstood the *Yogācāra* philosophy as an idealism found in the West or not. In this research, not only the contents of *Yogācāra* sources in Sanskrit but also in Chinese translations will be examined. In addition the facts which lead to the misunderstanding of *Yogācāra* philosophy as an idealism as known in the West, will be discussed. The crux of this article is to point out that *Yogācāra* philosophy has two. They are i. The outside world is only an ideation created by the inner mind, but it does not mean the real non-existence of the outside world, ii. The real existence and functioning of the mind is a fact. Chinese translators leaned more to the second thesis and they preferred the term *wei shi* which mean mind only. The causes behind the preference of the *wei shi* by Chinese translators in *Yogācāra* philosophy are discussed in this paper.

INTRODUCTION

There are many sources for the study of *Yogācāra* Buddhist philosophy. These can be divided into two main groups. The first includes certain *sūtras* from which *Yogācāra* philosophy draws its inspiration which began to appear in the third century A.D. Among them are: The *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, the *Mahāyāna-abhidharmaśāstra*, and the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, etc. The second includes the commentaries and the compendiums, written by Asanga and Vasubandhu who were the founders of the *Yogācāra* school. Asanga wrote among other things, the *Mahāyāna Saṃgraha* the *Abhidharma Samuccaya* and a Commentary on the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*. The important works of Vasubandhu include the *Twenty-Verse Treatise*, (*Viṃśatikā*) the *Thirty-Verse Treatise* (*Triṃśatikākā*) and the Commentary to the *Twenty-Verse Treatise*, (*Viṃśatikākārikā*).

Today, there are many secondary books dealing with the *Yogācāra* School and its philosophy. Among them D. J. Kalupahana's book *Buddha Darsana Itihasaya* written in Sinhala is important because he puts forward new views on the *Yogācāra* philosophy and some of its sources.¹ Similar views can be found in his English book *The Principles of Buddhist Psychology*.² According to Kalupahana the *Viñaptimātratāsiddhi* of Vasubandhu has been mistranslated into Chinese and Tibetan languages. He says: it is rather ironical to see that the term *viñaptimātra* of Vasubandhu's *Viñaptimātratāsiddhi*, has been translated wrongly as "vijñāna-mātra". The term "vijñaptimātra" means "ideation only" and "vijñāna-mātra" means "mind only". According to him this is a grave mistake made by Chinese and Tibetan translators, and also it contributed to the misunderstanding of Vasubandhu's philosophical concept of "ideation only" as "mind only". This also resulted in the misunderstanding of the *Yogācāra* tradition as idealism (*Vijñānavāda*).

Kalupahana further says that this situation became more confused because some part of the *Viñaptimātratāsiddhi* has been changed by Sylvan Levi when he edited the text again in Sanskrit.³ The text has two parts: one is *Twenty-Verse Treatise* (*Viṃśatikā*) and the second *Thirty-Verse-Treatise* (*Triṃśatikā*). As Kalupahana pointed out the first chapter of the original Sanskrit text of the *Twenty-Verse-Treatise* has disappeared and it was restored into Sanskrit by Sylvan Levi basing on Chinese and Tibetan translations. Sylvan Levi's edition has injected more idealistic sense to Vasubandhu and *Yogācāra* School. This leads to the misunderstanding of the whole *Yogācāra* philosophy as idealism or

“mind only” (*vijñānavāda*). Kalupahana quoted first few sentences of the Sylvan Levi’s Sanskrit edition of *Twenty two-Verse- Treatise* as follows:

*mahāyāne tridhātuka vijñaptimātraṃ vyavasthāpyate,
cittamātraṃ bho jina putrā yadūta tridhātukamiti sūtrāt, cittaṃ
mano vijñānaṃ vijñaptisceti paryāyā / cittamātra
sasamprayogamiti, mātramityarthaṃ pratiśedharthaṃ.*⁴

Kalupahana pointed out that the same misinterpretations can be seen in Vasubandhu’s pupil, Sthiramati’s commentary on *Thirty-Verse-Treatise* (*Triṃśatikākārikā*). This commentary too has explained Vasubandhu’s *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* in a more idealistic manner.

So the aim of this article is to examine the Yogācāra philosophy and attempt to see whether it focuses on “mind only” or “ideation only”. At the same time, an effort will be made to examine whether Yogācāra philosophy emphasizes both these facets of “*vijñāna*”.

PHILOSOPHIC BACKGROUND OF THE YOGĀCĀRA

The main factor that caused the origin of Buddhist traditions is the effort made by various Buddhist monk-scholars to reinterpret early Buddhism. They explained early Buddhist teachings according to their understanding. They faced the problem that if all conditioned phenomena in the world are impermanent and if there is no soul how could things exist and migrate from this life to the next life. It was necessary for them to answer this question according to early Buddhist point of view. So, various Buddhist monks came up with their own interpretations and this led to the mushrooming of different groups or traditions. They adopted logic and reasoning to answer these issues and this gave rise to many views that were mutually opposing. In this process of philosophic interpretations these groups influenced one another. Yogācāra philosophy was influenced by Mādhyamaka philosophy of “emptiness” (*sūnyatā*). Though, Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika tradition, explained and strongly emphasized that the “emptiness” is not nihilism or annihilationism, but meant *no-thingness*. However, ācārya Nāgārjuna’s concept of “emptiness” was taken as meaning nothingness. This situation was seen by another group of monks as a misinterpretation of Buddhism. These monks wanted to rescue Buddhism from this nihilistic point of view and they tried to explain early Buddhist teachings in a more positive perspective. These monks later came to be labeled as Yogācārins. So, it is in response to the concept of emptiness put forward by the Mādhyamika tradition that Yogācāra School originated.⁵

YOGĀCĀRA PHILOSOPHY AND ITS TWO EMPHASES

The philosophers of the *Abhidharma* schools taught that consciousness arises when the senses are in contact with objects. Yogācāra turns this commonsense *Abhidharma* position upside down. What Yogācāra claims is that consciousness actually produces the experience of sensations and their objects. It is not that a subject and an object come together to produce conscious experience, as in the *Abhidharma* model. Rather, for Yogācāra, there is a fundamental process of consciousness that produces one's experience of subjective selfhood on the one hand and the objective world on the other. One's experience of both oneself and the world arise dependently from a more fundamental process of consciousness. Traditionally, scholars of Buddhism have accepted this view as a form of Idealism, the theory that the world is a product of the mind. Today, this interpretation is being debated.

Another interpretation claims that the world as we know it is produced by the mind; what the world is in itself we have no way of knowing. Related to this view is an interpretation that approaches the matter from a non dualistic point of view, where the subject and the objects of experience arise together. In any case, for Yogācāra, one's experience of self and world is certainly generated by the mind. Given this position, the philosophical task for Yogācāra was to explain how consciousness can be the basis for both these subjective and objective aspects of experience.

To begin with, they claim that all the mental and physical elements (*dharmas*) in experience are arising dependently within a more fundamental process of consciousness. While Mādhyamika emphasized the emptiness of this dependent arising, Yogācāra goes a step further and claims that consciousness is the causal force behind such dependent arising. Consciousness forms itself into the six senses (including the mental faculty that "senses" thought objects) and the objects of these senses. As the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* says, consciousness is like water forming itself into waves.⁶ These six senses and their objects arise dependently from consciousness, accounting for the mental and physical elements of one's experience through a process that Yogācāra calls "ideation only" (*viññaptimātra*).

Behind this ideation process of the six sense-consciousnesses is, according to Yogācāra, a seventh form of consciousness that they call "mind" (*manas*).⁷ They claim that this more unitary faculty of consciousness is the basis of both inner reflection and self-awareness.

Self-awareness arises in the mind as it reflects on, or "follows", the dependent arising of the six senses and their objects. Because of this self-awareness, the mind concludes that it exists as an independent self, apart from the objects it experiences. But in fact, both one's self and the world are two dependently arisen aspects of an experiential process that is being produced by consciousness-by ideation only.

Yogācārin's also claim that behind the mind of self-awareness and reflection is the ultimate source of this whole ideation process. They call this eighth and final level of consciousness the "storehouse consciousness" (*ālaya-vijñāna*).⁸ In the storehouse consciousness is the fundamental unity of consciousness that is prior to all its forms. In its use of the above water and waves metaphor, the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* also says that storehouse consciousness generates from itself all forms of experience like the ocean whose water takes form as waves. In other words, out of its "storehouse", consciousness constructs the subjective experience of one's mind and senses, as well as the objective world of their experience. While one's self and the world seem to be so distinct from each other in experience, they are really just dependently arisen formations from the storehouse consciousness.

Yogācāra claims that the storehouse consciousness contains the karmic "seeds" deposited in it to form the process of conscious experience.⁹ These seeds influence the storehouse's ongoing construction of experience and account for its continuity. The seeds are influenced or "perfumed" (*vāsanā*) by one's positive and negative attitudes. For example, one's negative dispositions, such as the Three Roots of Evil (hatred, greed, and delusion), condition the seeds of future experience within the storehouse consciousness in ways that often lead to unwholesome thoughts, words, and actions. These unhealthy thoughts, words, and actions then produce new negative karmic seeds in the storehouse consciousness that, in turn, will affect one's future experience. Therefore, the storehouse consciousness accounts not only for one's experience of oneself and the world but also for the moral and spiritual qualities of that experience. This being the case, Yogācāra taught that one must change the karmic condition of the storehouse consciousness by the practice of the Six Perfections. These perfections cultivate "pure seeds" within the depths of the storehouse consciousness itself.

On the bodhisattva's Great Journey, mental defilements and afflictions are gradually eliminated, pure qualities are cultivated, and the mind is stilled by mediation. Then, when the inner conditions are right, at the very foundation of consciousness there is a sudden "conversion of the basis" (*āśrata-parvṛtti*). One's ordinary processes of consciousness stop,

and one gains an intuitive insight into the storehouse consciousness at its basis. Thereby, one attains freedom from all conditioned states of consciousness, Awakening, and Nirvāṇa.

Yogācāra's presentation of this radical and sudden turning over of the basis of consciousness greatly influenced East Asian Buddhism. Some East Asian Buddhist writers read Yogācāra as agreeing with the *Tathāgata-garbha* Literature. These writers believed that both traditions taught that the purity of spiritual life comes from the inherent luminous Buddha-qualities found within one's deepest center. The sudden turning over of the basis of consciousness was thought to reveal a non-dual *nirvāṇic* nature of luminous and pure consciousness, the unlimited Dharma-body, which is the essence of Awakening and Nirvāṇa. As we shall see, other Buddhist writers disagreed with this interpretation of Yogācāra, and this issue became important to the development of East Asian Buddhism.

Returning now to early Indian Yogācāra, besides its theory of consciousness, the school also presented what are called the Three Natures (*tri-sva-bhāva*) of experience.¹⁰ First is the "imagined" (*parikalpita*) nature of experience. That is, in one's ordinary experience, the self and the objects of that experience are seen to be independent entities, when, in fact, this independent nature of things in one's experience is made by *prapañca*. For Yogācāra, the imagined nature of experience is generated by the karmic seeds in the storehouse consciousness, along with the ego awareness of the mind.

Second is the "interdependent" (*paratantra*) nature of experience. Here, we find the Mādhyamaka "ultimate truth" that all entities are arising dependently or interdependently and are, therefore empty of "own-being". Yogācāra points out that this interdependent nature of the self and entities of experience is produced by consciousness. That is, while people "imagine" that they and the objects of their experience are independent, in fact, they arise in experience interdependently from the processes of consciousness. However, since ignorance leads people to imagine that oneself and the objects of the world are independent, one develops attachments, defilements, and *dukkha*. Thereby, unwholesome seeds are planted in the storehouse consciousness, which, in turn, play a part in this dependent arising of experience. Therefore, the "interdependent" nature of experience is pure and impure; good and evil. Because of attachment to the imagined independent things of ordinary experience and the resulting impurity of the interdependent nature of experience, Yogācāra posits a third nature. It does so to stress the need to purify oneself from the ignorance that is superimposing the imagined

fabrication of independence onto the interdependent nature of things. By this purification, one can cease making this superimposition, see the truth about the dependent arising of experience, and become free from attachment and the defiling of experience. One does so by following the Bodhisattva Path. The result of this purification is the third nature, which is called the "perfected" (*pariniṣpanna*) nature of experience. This perfected nature of experience is ultimately attained by the realization of Awakening, wherein one sees that all ordinary experience is a product of "ideation only" (*viññaptimātra*). With enlightened wisdom, one realizes Nirvana.

According to the above explanation it is clear that Yogācāra philosophy has several facets. The one is that the outside world is only ideation which is created by the inner mind. This interpretation also has two sides, one is the outside world is really non-existent but only the mind does exist. The other is both mind and outside world are really existent, but without functioning and contacting of the mind there is no way to experience the outside world, and in that sense outside world does not exist; what only exist, is the mind.

The first idea is closer to the idealism in Brahmanism and Western philosophy. These philosophies posit metaphysical and transcendental idealism which negates the existence of the outside world. This Buddhist "*viññānavāda*" should not be categorized into that group because it is more psychological than metaphysical and transcendental. Kalupahana very accurately expresses this idea as: "...then *viññānavāda* needs not necessarily mean "idealism" in a metaphysical sense. It could be psychology ("*viññāna*"=psyche, *vāda* =logos) as well".¹¹

The second view lays more emphasis on the existence and the functioning of the mind. Perhaps, it may be close to early Buddhist explanation of mind.¹² As this tradition highly emphasizes the existence of "*viññāna*" even today many scholars are of the view that this tradition should be named as "*Viññānavāda*". For instance Kapila Abhayawansa says: "so, *outside experiential thing is only an ideation (cittāmatra) and a mind (viññaptimātra) which is created by the mind. In that way the outside experiential world is confined into a ideation and this philosophy is known as a ideation only (viññaptimātra)*".¹³

CHINESE INTERPRETATION OF YOGĀCĀRA PHILOSOPHY

With the translation of Buddhist texts into Chinese language, Chinese scholasticism started to discuss Buddhist philosophy. Yogācāra tradition and books were translated into Chinese language on three occasions by

three famous teachers: They are Bodhiruci, Paramārtha, and Xuan Zhuang. The first is Bodhiruci's translation of Vasubandhu's *Vimśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (*Wei Shi Er Shi Lun*) into Chinese language and named as “*Wei shi Lun*” 《唯识论》. Though the original text has twenty two verses, in his translation there are twenty three verses. The second is Paramārtha's translation of the same text, but its name changed to *Mahāyāna Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (*Da Cheng Wei shi Lun*) 《大乘唯识论》 and it has twenty four verses. The third is Xuan Zhuang's translation of the same text, but it has only twenty one verses. He named it as “*Wei shi Ershi Lun*”. 《唯识二十论》.

All these three translators used the term “wei shi” (唯识) which means “mind only” (*vijñānamātratā*) for “Vasubandhu's term “*vijñaptimātra*” which means ideation only (*Wei liao bie* - 唯了别). Xuan Zhuang's (596-664 A.D.) translation records it as follows: “又为开示谬执我法，迷唯识者，令达二空，于唯识论如实知故。复有迷谬唯识理者，或执外境如识非无，或执内识如境非有，或执诸识用别体同，或执离心无别心所：为遮此等种种异执，令于唯识深妙理中得如实解，故作斯论”。 (*Cheng Wei Shi Lun*, 卷一).¹⁴ Explaining this quotation of ancient text of Xuan Zhuang, Lai Yong Hai says that this interpretation puts forward the view that the real truth of “wei shi” (mind only) means “outside world is non-existent, only exist is the mind” (“外境”之“无”，“内识”之“有”). Xuan Zhuang's disciple Kui Ji (632-682 A.D) in his commentary (*成唯识论述记* - *Cheng Wei Shi Lun Shu ji*) on *Cheng Wei Shi Lun* also explains Yogācāra philosophy in a meaning similar to his teacher, Xuan Zhuang as follows: “唯谓简别，遮无外境。识谓能了，诠有内心。识体即唯，持业释也。识性识相，皆不离心。心所心王，以识为主。归心泯相，总言唯识。唯遮境有，执有者 其真；识简心空，滞空者乖其实”。 (卷一). Explaining this Lai Yong Hai says that mind only teaching (*wei shi*) has been analyzed by Kui Ji in two ways: one is denial of the outside world and the second is affirmation of the inside “*vijñāna*”. Inside world and all its empirical things are not out of “*vijñāna*”. In this way, Kui Ji emphasized “outside world is non-existent, what exists is only the mind”. (“唯识”的根本意义有两个方面，一是否定外境，二是肯定内识。一切性相离不开心识。这样，他就强调“无境有识”。)¹⁵.

In this regard, Chinese scholar Zhou Gui Hua has written a very important article “Difference between ‘Mind only and Ideation only’: Re-annotation of the Fundamental Question of Yogācāra Studies” 《唯识与唯了别---“唯识学”的一个基本问题的再诠释》.¹⁶ In this article,

he pointed out that this mistranslation and misunderstanding of Vasubandhu's standpoint of Yogācāra philosophy (*vijñaptimātratā*) was done by Chinese translators found by Chinese scholar, Cheng (吕) about one thousand years after Xuan Zhuang. It is said that being influenced by the views of Japanese and Western scholars he started to examine the original Sanskrit texts and found this mistake. But, he was reluctant to popularize it because he thought that it goes against the great teachers who translated the original texts into Chinese. So, he kept silent. Later on, in 70th and 80th decades two Chinese scholars: one from Beijing "Han Jing Qing", and one from Hong Kong "Huo Tao Hui" raised this issue again and discussed the difference between "wei shi" (唯识 - "*vijñāna-mātra*") and "wei liao bie" (唯了别 - *vijñaptimātratā*)

So, the important question is why great teachers like Xuan Zhuang and other translators understood and used "*vijñaptimātratā*" ("wei liao bie" - 唯了别). as "*vijñāna-mātratā*" ("wei shi" - 唯识) ? , is it really a mistake or not? So, it is also necessary to understand why Chinese scholars emphasize non-existence of the outside world?

In this regard I wish to draw attention to important facts. One is that in China four terms "xin" 心 (*citta*), "yi" 意 (*manas*), "shi" "识" (*vijñāna*), "liao" 了 (*vijñapti*), are considered as basically same in meaning. More or less, the same interpretation can be seen in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*.¹⁷ So, Chinese translator Xuan Zhuang and others may have thought that these four terms are interchangeable. Hence, the problem is not in the terms but the interpretation given by them. They explained Vasubandhu's Yogācāra philosophy as which negate the existence of the outside world and emphasize the existence of mind or *vijñāna* only. In this regard Chinese researcher Zhou Gui Hua has pointed out very important facts that why Chinese ancient scholastics translated the Sanskrit term "*vijñaptimātratā*" as "wei shi"? He says that as Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy is totally against the concept of substance in both mind and matter (*dharmānairātmyatā*) put forward by sectarian Buddhism, so, there is no way to understand "*vijñāna*" in a eternalistic perspective as idealism understood in the West. Another fact he pointed out is that the terms "xin" 心 (*citta*), "yi" 意 (*manas*), "shi" 识 (*vijñāna*), "liao" 了 (*vijñapti*), are different as designation but same in meaning. As evidence he pointed out the three Chinese translations of early Sanskrit Yogācāra books namely *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* 《瑜伽师地论》、*Madhyantavibhaṅga* 《辨中边论》、*Māhāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* 《大乘庄严经论》 have used two terms "*citta*" and "*vijñāna*" to discuss "*vijñāna-mātra*". They did not use the term "*vijñaptimātratā*" to discuss

“*viññāna-mātra*” because they understood that “*viññāna-mātra*” represents the same meaning of “*viññaptimātra*”.¹⁸

CONCLUSION

As mentioned above the Yogācāra philosophy has two facets: one is emphasis of the continual process of “*viññāna*”, second the emphasis on non-existence of the outside world since it is understood through the “*viññāna*” it is only an ideation (*viññaptimātra*). Vasubandhu emphasizes this second view of Yogācāra philosophy. Chinese scholars prefer the first emphasis of Yogācāra philosophy and so they used the term “*viññāna-mātra*” (“*wei shi*” - 唯识) instead of “*viññaptimātra*” (*wei liao bie*”-唯了别) of Vasubandhu.

It is clear that Chinese scholars deny the existence of the outside world and emphasize the process of “*viññāna*” without resorting to eternalism. This view is similar to the early Yogācārins. Though Chinese scholars used the term “*viññāna-mātra*” (mind only) they did not misinterpret Yogācāra philosophy as idealism (*viññānavāda*) in the west. They prefer to use the term “*viññāna-mātra*” (mind only) perhaps, they have thought it is the most important facet of Yogācāra philosophy. Therefore, it is not reasonable to accuse Chinese scholars of misinterpreting early Yogācāra philosophy.

ABBREVIATIONS

Lanka	<i>Laṅkāvatārasūtra</i> .
Trims	<i>Triṃśatikā</i>
Vims	<i>Viṃśatikā</i>
VMS	<i>Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi</i>

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NOTES

- ¹ Kalupahana, D.J., (2003) *Bauddha Darsana Itihasaya*, p.189-190 .
- ² Kalupahana, D.J., (1987) *Principles of Buddhist Psychology*, p.134.
- ³ Kalupahana, D.J., (2003) *History of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 189-190.
- ⁴ Kalupahana, D.J., (2003) *Bauddha Darsana Itihasaya*, p. 189-190.
- ⁵ Nagao, Gadjin M., (1992) *Mādhyamika and Yogācāra*, p 214.
- ⁶ *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* , śloka, 99-100.
taramgā hyudadheryadvatpavanapratyayeritāḥ |
nṛtyamānāḥ pravartante vyucchedaśca na vidyate || 99 ||
ālayaughastathā nityam viṣayapavaneritaḥ |
citraistaramgavijñānairnṛtyamānaḥ pravartate || 100 ||
- ⁷ *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* , śloka, 102.
na cānyena ca nānanyena taramgā hyudadhermatāḥ |
vijñānāni tathā sapta cittena saha samyutāḥ || 102 ||
- ⁸ *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* , śloka, 104.
cittam manaśca vijñānam lakṣaṇārtham prakalpyate |
abhinnalakṣaṇā hyaṣṭau na lakṣyā na ca lakṣaṇam || 104 ||
- ⁹ *Trīṃśikā*, śloka 18.
sarvabījam hi vijñānam pariṇāmastathā tathā|
yātyanyo'nyavaśād yena vikalpaḥ sa sa jāyate||18||
- ¹⁰ *Trīṃśikā*, śloka, 23.
trividhasya svabhāvasya trividhām niḥsvabhāvatām|
sandhāya sarvadharmāṇām deśitā niḥsvabhāvatā||23||
- ¹¹ Kalupahana, D. J., (1987) *Principles of Buddhist Psychology*, p. 127.
- ¹² Abhayawansa, Kapila, (1999) *Bauddha Adhyayana* , p. 74-86.
- ¹³ Pannakitti, Hiripitiye, (2003) *Bauddha Vijñānavadaya*, Preface, xi .
- ¹⁴ 赖永海. (2000) 《中国佛教百科全书 - 宗教卷》 P.183.
- ¹⁵ 赖永海. (2000) 《中国佛教百科全书 - 宗教卷》 P.184.
- ¹⁶ 周贵华. 《唯识与唯了别——“唯识学”的一个基本问题的再诠释》, 哲学研究, 2004年第 期.

¹⁷ *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, śloka, 104.

*cittaṃ manaśca vijñānaṃ lakṣaṇārthaṃ prakalpyate /
abhinnaalakṣaṇā hyaṣṭau na lakṣyā na ca lakṣaṇam // 104 //*

¹⁸ 在原始、部派佛教那里，识有其自体性，而了别是识相，是识对境的认识功能，显然，了别与识二者有体、相之别。但大乘佛教否定诸法的自性，诸法由缘起而生的相（功能）就成为法之体性，即体、相二者可同义使用。在此意义上，则不能说识有自性，此时，识别或了别亦即识的体性，识与识别、了别同义。所以，《唯识二十论》说：“心、意、识、了（即了别），名之差别”。（《大正藏》三十一册）即认为识与了别义一，只是名异而已。而且在瑜伽行派的早期文献如《瑜伽师地论》、《辨中边论》、《大乘庄严经论》等中，基本还是从心、识而非从“了别”角度谈“唯识”义。因此，用“唯识”代表“唯了别”甚至全体唯识学，也不是没有依据的。