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**Do *Anāsavā Lokuttaramaggaṅgā* Fall in Formations  
(*Saṅkhārā*)?**

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## **Do *Anāsavā Lokuttaramaggaṅgā* Fall in Formations (*Saṅkhārā*)?**

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### **Clarification of Research Problem:**

Is it correct to identify supra-mundane practice of Eightfold Noble Path (*anuttarā lokuttara maggaṅgā*) with mental formations (*saṅkhārā*)?

*Saṅkhārā*, the plural constitute of the Aggregate of Formations of the Five Aggregates (*Saṅkhārakkhandha*), is the old classification of empirical being found in the discourses. *Saṅkhārā* is also the second of the twelve-link formula of the dependent origination. We have seen in the discourses that formations are quite often taken as equal in meaning to *Saṅkhatā* (compounded phenomena) and thereby to be a generic term to denote all mundane phenomena of empirical existence (*lokiyā-dhammā*). In this sense, all the positive and negative mental phenomena are required to be included within the category of formations and they happen to be with following qualities-

- 1) They are impermanent, suffering and soulless (because compounded phenomena are always with those characteristics as revealed in such instances as *sabbesaṅkhārāniccā*, *sabbesaṅkhārādukkhā* and *sabbedhammānattā*)
- 2) They are formed by ignorance. (as formations are considered to generate by ignorance as said in such instances as *avijjāpaccayāsaṅkhārā*)

Once we include all the wholesome and unwholesome mental phenomena among the formations non-sensuous taintless practice leading to supra-mundane state (*anāsavālokuttaramaggaṅgā*), that is, the cultivation of Eight-fold Noble Path inclined towards *nibbāna* also essentially become not only impermanent etc. but also the outcome of ignorance. These path factors leading to *nibbāna*, the state totally devoid of ignorance, would then as a consequence be seen as being empowered by ignorance.

However, since wholesome mental phenomena also have the characteristic of impermanence in the view of Buddhism it is therefore doubtful to hold the view that mental phenomena caused by higher mental culture of an earnest follower are rooted in ignorance. This later view is totally contradictory to the Buddhist position that non-greed, non-hatred and non-delusion become the root causes (*mūla*) only for wholesome mental (*kusalā-dhammā*) thoughts to arise. This kind of interpretation of formations necessarily must be looked as inconvenient to Buddhist philosophy which is always found to have been discoursed on a sound logical ground. Moreover, if ignorance is accepted as a basis for even the good conduct of the individual, the moral life of the follower who is not yet come to the path level constitutes a pessimistic and negative spectrum of Buddhist practice.

### **Aims and Objectives**

The aim of this paper is to inquire into whether our understanding of formations (*saṅkhārā*) is correct. The research paper shows that 1) the popular notion that *saṅkhārā* embody all mental phenomena is not an acceptable thesis from the point of

view of early discourses, and 2) this faulty assumption was due to wrong interpretation of the list of components of the Aggregate of Formations in the *Dhammasaṅgīṇī* of Abhidhamma. Although *saṅkhārā* are also within the fold of *saṅkhatā* the former has a wider range of meanings than the latter. It should be noted as this study will show that while *saṅkhatā* consist of all mental and physical phenomena including what is morally good and bad *saṅkhārā* does not have anything to do with some of such morally good acts of the individual. Our objective is to show *Saṅkhārā* form the dynamic domain of unwholesome tendencies of the individual.

### Methodology

This study consists of two major aspects- 1) understanding scholarly interpretations of *saṅkhārā*, and 2) inquiring into what *saṅkhārā* actually meant in early Discourses in the *Nikāya*-s and Abhidhamma. Necessarily for the former the author will use secondary sources and for the latter only primary sources- *Nikāya*-s, Abhidhamma and Commentaries.

### The Aggregate of Formations and *saṅkhārā*: Scholars' Views

*Saṅkhārā* has been a very difficult term to translate into occidental languages. Rhys Davids and Stede say (*The Pali-English Dictionary*: 664) that “it is almost impossible for occidental terminology to get at the root of its meaning”. As *saṅkhatā* and *saṅkhārā* are closely connected and *saṅkhatā* often occurs in place of *saṅkhārā* (*Samyuttanikāya* I: 112, *Aṅguttaranikāya* I: 83), many scholars have opted to take them as being entirely equal in meaning.

Rhys Davids and Stede were foremost to hold *saṅkhārā* to denote all conditioned phenomena and they say “*saṅkhārā* in the widest sense.... all the things which have been made up by pre-existing causes”(*The Pali-English Dictionary*: 664, 665). Childers (Childers, 1993: 455) also takes that *saṅkhatā* and *saṅkhārā* are synonymous. Nyanatiloka in his *Buddhist Dictionary* identifies *saṅkhārā* to be identical with *saṅkhatā* (Nyanatiloka, 1980: 200). Boisvert (Boisvert, 1997: 94) taking into account some popular phrases dealing with three signata of *dhammā* says “I do not think that, here, the term *dhammā* is used in a different sense than *saṅkhārā*”. He equates *saṅkhārā* for *dhammā*, a term which includes experience of *nibbāna* as well.

Anālayo in an article published in the *Encyclopedia of Buddhism* (Anālayo, 2007: 732 ff) explains mental formations in a comprehensive manner and for our purpose we have summarized here his observations. I have taken his observation for the following two reasons- 1) he takes formations as volitional forces which is totally in agreement with the present writer’s understanding of formations and 2) he also identifies some incompatibilities of contextual meanings of the same term (This issue of *Saṅkhārā* is not taken into much account in his study as in the present one by this author) It should be mentioned however Anālayo is also among those who took *saṅkhārā* and *saṅkhatā* to be equal in meaning.

- The aggregate of *Saṅkhārā* is the cognitive aspect of the individual. According to *Mahāpuaṇṇamasutta*, it is dependent on feeling and perception.

- *Saṅkhārā* are the volitional activities. In such instances as *Pabbajjābhisāṅkhāra* (volition to go forth) (*Udāna*: 57), *gamiyābhisāṅkhāra* (volition to visit) (*Aṅguttaranikāya* IV: 04), *padhānasāṅkhāra* (volitional striving) (*Samyuttanikāya* V: 268) and *iddhābhisāṅkhāra* (super normal determination) (*Majjhimanikāya* I: 253) it signifies the volitional forces or tendencies for general activities and supra-normal performances. *Saṅkhārā* represent the beginning stage of mental activity, the first inclination or tendency that precedes the arising of thought.
- In the same way as other aggregates, the aggregate of mental formations is subjected to impermanence, suffering and no-self. *Saṅkhārā* should not be taken either as a self, or a part of self, or as an expression of self.
- In the *Abhidhamma*, the aggregate of mental formations is expanded to embody a wide range of mental factors including contact, mental application, the five faculties and powers, the factors of the noble eightfold path etc. *Abhidhamma* analysis goes beyond the “implication of aggregate of mental formations in early discourses, where it represented mainly the volitional aspect of mental experience.
- *Saṅkhārā*, according to how it is linked in the formula of dependent co-arising has an equivalent role as *cetanā*, which also means volition. And is having directive power over *viññāṇa* (consciousness).
- *Saṅkhārā* represent the creative power of the individual and they are building blocks of sentient existence (*Sabbesattāsāṅkhāraṭṭhitikā*).
- There are also different types of formations from mere volitional force. They are found in relation to three aspects of formations- bodily, verbal and mental, respectively standing for breath, application of thought (*vitakka*) and sustained thought (*vicāra*) and perception (*saññā*) and feeling (*vedanā*). Reaching the cessation of perception and feeling as described in the *Cūlavedalla-sutta* (*Majjhimanikāya* I: 301), first verbal formations cease and then follow bodily formations and mental formations.
- Among the *Saṅkhārā* Eightfold Noble Path is the best<sup>1</sup> (*Aṅguttaranikāya* II: 34) although the goal of it is not within the fold of *saṅkhārā*.

The above explanation by Anālayo based on the Discourses suggests for us the conclusion that formations are:

- common to every sentient being,
- produced by ignorance,
- Causes for suffering etc.
- And an equivalent to denote all the dependently arisen phenomena.

### ***Saṅkhārā* and Related Issues**

We will now raise this question: If formations are common to everyone then how is it possible that *arhant*-s are really liberated? *Arhant*-s are those who have eradicated all the unwholesome tendencies and they cannot have any form of tendencies associated with ignorance. Then we have to question again whether *saṅkhārā* are always associated with ignorance or not. This question is much related to the main

focus of this paper; that is, whether the practice of path factors leading to Supra-mundane state are produced by a will power associated with ignorance.

It is a well-known fact that all the sentient beings until their full perfection have unwholesome root causes such as greed, hatred and delusion controlling their conduct. But at a given time in which one performs a wholesome action, would Buddhist doctrine say that he also has ignorance rooted in his action that time? It is very easy to answer positively because Buddhism distinguishes two types of wholesome deeds- Those affected by taints (*sāsava*) and those are not affected by taints (*anāsavā*). Even the practice of the eightfold noble path can be distinguished between these two streams. In the *Mahācattārīsaka-sutta* each factor is observed in terms of the two sides- Those that are affected by taints, partaking of merits, ripening on the side of attachment (*sāsavāpuññabhāgiyāupadhivepakkhā*) and those that are noble, taintless, and leading to supra-mundane (*anāsavālokuttaramaggaṅgā*) (*The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha*: 937). The second group is directly related to the practice of the earnest follower to release him from the bond of cycle of existence.

These are the factors that we have the issue with. Do they also have elements of ignorance as their roots? It is impossible to answer positively because if done so there is no difference between the first method and the second method of spiritual cultivation. But again we have before us the question, if mental formations which are caused by ignorance are the volitional force for each and every thought, *anāsavālokuttaramaggaṅgā* cannot be devoid of ignorance.

The major issue here is that the term *saṅkhatā* (the compounded), is a term that covers all the material and mundane mental world of the sentient beings and is closely connected with *saṅkhārā* which also falls in the mundane world. *Saṅkhatā* is synonymous to the *paṭiccasamuppannā-dhammā* (dependently co-arisen phenomena) which are the phenomena that have been born (*jātam*) and having come into being (*bhūtam*). *Paṭicca samuppannādhammā* are elaborated either in terms of the Five Aggregates or the limbs of the twelve-link formula of dependent co-arising (*Samyuttanikāya* II: 26, *Samyuttanikāya* III: 24). This definitely reveals that both *saṅkhatā* and *saṅkhārā* have very similar bearings. As such, we are advised to be very careful in proposing any difference between the two. Do they really have any difference?

An observation by Anālayo lends support to the conclusion that the similarity of the word origin does not guarantee an essential similarity of the meaning in application of the word in different contexts. He shows that the term *saṅkhāra* itself has been used in a totally different sense in different occurrences, division of *saṅkhāra* into three as *kāya-saṅkhāra* etc., for instance. He reveals that the division of mental formations into three aspects as verbal etc. is contradictory to how *saṅkhārā* is presented in relation to dependent co-arising. Formations of twelve link formula are clearly introduced as being caused by ignorance.

In the *Cullavedalla-sutta* in which three-fold division is seen (*Majjhimanikāya* I: 130), as was given above, it is said that in the attempt to reach cessation one has to gradually drop three types of formation. In the *Ānāpānasatisutta* (*Majjhimanikāya*

III: 82) it is mentioned that calming of the mental formations (*passambhayaṃcittasaṅkhāraṃ*) is a highly important aspect of the progress of the mindfulness on breath. Anālayo observes that the three types of formations in the *Mahāvedalla-sutta* are not applicable to the *saṅkhārā* of dependently co-arising the scheme of which depends totally on ignorance. If the breath etc. are taken as *Saṅkhārā* “they are still present in *arahant*, in whom however ignorance has been eradicated” (Anālayo, 735). Anālayo concludes therefore two definitions of *saṅkhārā* are different and cannot be applicable conveniently for both contexts interchangeably. If *saṅkhāra* occurs in a compound it could be either morally good or bad. So it should be concluded therefore such occurrences as *gamiyābhisāṅkhāra* (volition to visit) (*Āṅguttaranikāya*IV: 04), *padhānasaṅkhāra* (volitional striving) (*Samyuttanikāya* V: 268), *iddhābhisāṅkhāra* (super normal determination) (*Majjhimanikāya* I: 253), and *āyusaṅkhāra* which are factors in the liberated ones (*arahant*-s) are not the same in meaning as the *saṅkhārā*, a technical term to denote a special kind of volitional power.

### ***Saṅkhārā* from other sources**

The fundamental problem of humans the Buddha showed was grasping (*upādāna*). Whatever comes within the empirical world, the immature (*assutavāpuṭhujjano*) individual is used to grasp. This means he identifies himself with the empirical world with the wrong view of my, I or mine- the very self-conceit. The individual is succumbed to this psychological process and he is overwhelmed by the results of that grasping. The grasping is explained in many contexts in relation to famous Buddhist classification of empirical being- the Five Aggregates. Reading some of the sources it becomes very clear that it is this Aggregate of Formation that characterise this psychological process of formation. *Khajjanīya-sutta* (*Samyuttanikāya* III: 87) is a source one should not miss in the attempt to understand the nature of Aggregate of Formation. However it seems like we have not properly interpreted this sutta for this purpose.

*Saṅkhārā* are defined in the *sutta*-s as those things that are composed (*abhisāṅkharonti*), derived from the compound (*Saṅkhatam*)<sup>2</sup>. The composing here means formation and that is the psychological process of taking empirical world for self (*attāya*).<sup>3</sup> The compound world of forms is composed with self-conceit (*rūpattāya*). In the same way auditory world, gustatory world etc. of experience is distorted in such a way that they are grasped with self-conceit. It is very noteworthy that the both words *saṅkhata* and *saṅkhārā* are used here with their different meanings. *Saṅkhata*, the compounded, is what is made subjected to composing and *saṅkhārā* are the factors responsible for composition.

The plural *saṅkhārā* is given here as a plural Third Person verb (*abhisāṅkaronti*) to denote their nature of dynamism- formation. Here in this example or elsewhere, there is no singular of *saṅkhārā* being used except where a special aspect of formation is intended like *kāya saṅkhāra* (bodily formations) etc. mentioned above and in those instances *saṅkhārā* bears a different meaning from *saṅkhārā*. This plural subject verb combination signifies that *Saṅkhārakkhandha*, though is one aspect of empirical organism consists of many number of mental factors. It is the dynamism of many of these interplaying factors that we should recognise as

formations. What these many factors are is not clear in the discourses as they never enumerated the factors belonging to the aggregate as such. It has been undertaken for the first time in the *Dhammasaṅgīṇī* of *Abhidhamma* (*Dhammasaṅgīṇī*: 17 ff).

At a glance, this list in the *Dhammasaṅgīṇī* looks to be a haphazard analysis and elaboration of the conative aspect of the individual. Even though, *saṅkhārakkhandha* is introduced in association with ignorance in the Discourses, in this list of the *Dhammasaṅgīṇī* both wholesome and unwholesome mental phenomena corresponding to their thoughts are also included. We know however that *Abhidhamma* is not children's play.

A close observation of the *Dhammasaṅgīṇī* analysis will show that these factors include mental factors that can precede a psychological process including contact, volition, application of thought, sustained thought, mental one-pointedness (*cittassekaggatā*) which were more systematically arranged in the *Abhidhamma* later as Universals and other mental phenomena, which become influential in different levels of spirituality. Such categories as Faculties, powers path factors are those which become a part of conative aspect of the person with the progress of mind culture.

The real meaning of the *Dhammasaṅgīṇī* lays in the actual practice of *samatha* (practice of tranquillity) and *vipassanā* (practice of insight). A serious practitioner of *samatha* can clearly explain how a Faculty becomes dominant at different times and how those same faculties influence the on-going thought process of the individual momentarily and thereby the clarity of labelling the same element as *indriya* (dominant) and *bala* (power) in the same list. This is not a transgression of early discourses but a list of real factors that characterise volitional force.

It should be noted however that these wholesome factors cannot be regarded arbitrarily as formations. This is the reason why *Dhammasaṅgīṇī* list seem to be controversial at first glance. It is this *Dhammasaṅgīṇī* list of formations that has most probably resulted in many accepting *saṅkhārā* as designating all empirical factors. The reason is that there are all good and bad mental phenomena included in the same list. We have to be careful however in interpreting them as the *saṅkhārakkhandha* because in the Discourses we do not come across instances where *saṅkhārā* are described in relation to wholesome acts.

### **Are there wholesome *saṅkhārā*?**

Why the *Dhammasaṅgīṇī* list of *saṅkhārā* includes wholesome factors while *saṅkhārā* are always defined and introduced as related to ignorance need to be further considered. We have shown the possibility that the practice of goodness can be involved with taints. Can there be wholesome *saṅkhārā* with no taints?

*Saṅkhārā* are always represented in a negative and derogatory sense in the early Discourses. In the *Sattasuriya-sutta* of the *Aṅguttaranikāya* (*Aṅguttaranikāya* IV: 100) the Buddha emphatically reveals that the *saṅkhārā* are of impermanent, unstable and insecure nature and instructs monks to be dissatisfied, repelled, and to be free of them.<sup>4</sup> The *Parivīmaṃsana-sutta* of the *Samyuttanikāya* (*Samyuttanikāya* II: 82) stresses that it is with ignorance that the individual performs the will power

for *puññābhisāṅkhārā*, *apuññābhisāṅkhārā* and *āneñjābhisāṅkhārā*. The commentary of the *Patisambhidāmagga* (*Saddhammapakāsinī* I: 357) explains them as given in the table:

<i>puññābhisāṅkhārā</i>	Volition of eight wholesome thoughts of sensuous world and that of five wholesome thoughts of form world
<i>apuññābhisāṅkhārā</i>	Volition of 12 unwholesome thoughts of the sensuous world
<i>āneñjābhisāṅkhārā</i>	Volition of four thoughts of the formless world

We can note that all these thoughts belong to mundane world. It is well-known that there is no ultimate happiness in accumulating merits and achieving trances. There is no real release from the bond of cyclical existence by both. All of those wholesome thoughts together with their volitional forces therefore can be identified in the good actions that are affected by taints, partaking of merits, ripening on the side of attachment (*sāsavā puññabhāgiyā upadhivepakkhā*) described above. There is not any mention of formations with reference to *anāsavā lokuttaramaggaṅgā* in this *sutta* or elsewhere in the *sutta*-s. As we will observe later *kusalābhisāṅkhāra* (will power of supra-mundane conduct) is not found in the discourses.

What then is the nature of will power for good actions or the practice of the individual who is earnestly endeavouring for final liberation here and now?

As was mentioned above, we already know that in meditation practice it is essential to calm formations. Un-calmed formations always have tendency toward all types of self-conceit and thereby lead to suffering. Development of wholesome tendencies called *kusalā-dhammā* is the only way to calm formations. The practice of mindfulness is the path to cultivate wholesome emotions.

Mindfulness practice taught in the *Āṅgāpānasatisutta* (*Majjhimanikāya* III: 80 ff) has provided a list of methods of cultivation to develop wholesomeness. The more the practitioner develops wholesomeness the more the formations are calmed. With the perfect realization of arahantship all the unwholesome tendencies in the mind cease. This is why *nibbāna* is defined (*Majjhimanikāya* I: 167) as a state where all formations are calmed (*sabbasaṅkhārasamatha*). And *nibbāna* is defined (*The Dhammapada*: 44) also as a state that mind reaches formationless-ness (*visaṅkhāragataṃ*). Thus, *kusala* is intended to gradually calm down tendencies of formations until they cease to disappear in the state of arahantship. So *kusalā* are not totally independent from formations though they are polar opposite tendencies of the latter. Logically therefore it is not a fallacy to list wholesome factors in the *Dhammasaṅgīṇī* analysis of *saṅkhārā*. Thus, the mental factors conducive for calming formations are also a part of the same empirical reality.

### **Spiritual nature of *Anāsavā lokuttara-maggaṅgā***

How do we understand the spiritual condition of *anāsavā lokuttaramaggaṅgā*? Are they devoid of ignorance or do they still have some amount of ignorance when they



are put into practice? The *Parivīmamsana-sutta* (*Samyuttanikāya* II: 82) reveals the potential of the practitioner not to let *samkhārā* or *cetanā* influence (*anabhisankaronto anabhisañcetayanto*) the psychological process of grasping, the very root of formations that becomes the path of his awakening.<sup>5</sup> The *Mahāniddesa* also points out (*Mahāniddesa*: 424) that it is possible for a person to sustain will power inclined towards *nibbāna* while he is observing normal monastic practices.<sup>6</sup> It is interesting that the *Mahāniddesa* distinguishes between unwholesome will power and wholesome will power. The *Mahāniddesa* proposes the term *kusalābhisankhārā* for wholesome formations although such a thing is absent in early Discourses. What is important is that the *Mahāniddesa* signifies the position of the early discourses that mere *samkhārā* does not represent will power of taintless wholesome conduct. If they are counted separately, they must be specified with ‘*kusala*’ as an adjective. With that we conclude that *samkhārā* is a generic technical term to denote formations of grasping rooted in ignorance only. Although *samkhata* can be applied for both wholesome and unwholesome mental factors *samkhārā* represents only the dynamic psychological process of grasping.

The stopping of grasping is the way to *nibbāna*. Any moment that the practitioner cultivates *anāsavā lokuttaramaggaṅgā* is a moment that he is devoid of grasping and in other words a moment devoid of *samkhārā*. This does not mean however that person is totally free from ignorance. To give an example- there are three men; The first one’s legs and hands are tightly bound together in such a way that they cannot move; The second one who can only move within a certain area and is restricted in going beyond that prescribed region; the third one is totally free to go anywhere he wishes. Now, the practice of the *anuttarā lokuttaramaggaṅgā* of the ordinary individual can be compared to the freedom of the second one. He is free but not as fully free as the third one. His freedom is obstructed by restrictions to move and can be put again into the position of the first. The *arhant* in whom all cankers are gone can be compared to the fully free person.

In addition, it should be stressed that *anuttarā lokuttaramaggaṅgā* are not permanently established in the practitioner. They are also subjected to impermanence etc. and are therefore *paṭiccasamuppannā-dhammā*. When the practitioner comes out of the mental setting of the practice or wholesome act, as it should be, he can be overwhelmed again by some form of grasping. As was said earlier, the very wholesome act can become an object for unwholesome thought another time later. For instance, a person who has done some meritorious action may enjoy it later with a tainted mind which results in occurring in the mind faulty or unwholesome thoughts. In the object condition of the *Paṭṭhāna*, this is systematically elaborated- faulty thoughts take as their objects faultless thoughts (Narada, 1979: 95). It can be said however that the practitioner at the moment of his cultivation of certain wholesome factor is not with ignorance. And at that moment his practice is not considered to be suffering (*dukkha*) as it does not generate suffering like the acts empowered by formations. This is totally in agreement with a *Vibhaṅga* passage<sup>7</sup> in which *kusala* is omitted from the list of phenomena causing suffering (*Vibhaṅga*: 106). It should be stressed again that for the practitioner (*sekha*) still the wholesome emotions are impermanent, could be object of suffering once they are made subjected to grasping and like *nibbāna* they are impersonal. It is

in this sense that the Buddha says among the *saṅkhtā* (dependently co-arisen phenomena) the Noble Eightfold Path is the best (*Aṅguttaranikāya* II: 34).<sup>8</sup>

### Conclusion

The term ‘*Saṅkhāra*’ as it is used in Buddhist literature has variety of connotations. It gets a special technical meaning when it is used as *saṅkhārā*. According to the early discourses, *saṅkhārā* represent the will power always associated with ignorance as it is a cause of the grasping at a person. *Anāsavālokuttaramaggaṅgā* are not *saṅkhārā* but wholesome emotions that are an antidote to *saṅkhārā* to calm them until they are totally eradicated in full perfection. The notion that *saṅkhārā* represent all phenomena of existence is not compatible with the early Discourses.

### Abbreviations

Note- All the Texts of which publisher is not given are PTS texts

The *Aṅguttaranikāya* II

The *Aṅguttaranikāya* IV

The *Dhammasaṅgīhī*

The *Mahāniddeśa*

The *Majjhimanikāya* I

The *Majjhimanikāya* III

The *Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha* (Tr. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli). (1995).  
Buddhist Publication Society: Kandy.

The *Saddhammapakāsinī* I

The *Samyuttanikāya* III

The *Samyuttanikāya* II

The *Samyuttanikāya* III

The *Samyuttanikāya* V

The *Dhammapada*

The *Udāna*

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## End Notes

<sup>1</sup> Here the word used is not *saṅkhārā* but *saṅkhatā*. a

<sup>2</sup> *Saṅkhatamabhisaṅkharontī kho bhikkhave tasmā saṅkhārā'tivuccati. Kiñca saṅkhatamabhisaṅkharonti?rupaṃ rūpattāya saṅkhatamabhisaṅkharonti vedanaṃ vadanattāya...*

<sup>3</sup> The present researcher takes 'atta' in *rūpattāya* etc. signifies the involvement of self-conceit in cognizing the empirical world.

<sup>4</sup> *Aniccā bhikkhave saṅkhārā adhuvābhikkhave saṅkhārā anassāsikā bhikkhave saṅkhārā. Yāvañcidaṃ bhikkhave alameva sabbasaṅkhāresu nibbindituṃ alaṃ virajjituṃ alaṃ vimuccituṃ.*

<sup>5</sup> *Anabhisaṅkharonto anabhisañcetayanto nakiñciloke upādiyati; anupādiyaṃ na paritassati, aparitassaṃ paccattaññe'va parinibbāyati. 'Khīṇājāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ itthattāyā'tipajānāti.*

<sup>6</sup> *Idhekacco dānaṃ dento sīlaṃ samādiyanto uposathakammaṃ karonto pānīyaṃ paribhojanīyaṃ upaṭṭhapento parivenaṃ sammajjanto cetiyaṃ vandanto cetiyegandhamālaṃ āropento cetiyaṃ padakkhiṇaṃ karonto yaṃkiñci tedhātukaṃ kusalābhisaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharonto na gatihetu na upapattihetu na paṭisandhihetu na bhavahetu nasamsārahetu na vaṭṭahetu, sabbam taṃ visaṃyogādhippāyo nibbānaninno nibbānapoṇo nibbānapabbhāro abhisaṅkharoti.*

<sup>7</sup> *Avasesā ca kilesā avasesā ca akusalā dhammāṭṭhī ca kusalamūlāni sāsavāni avasesā ca sāsavā kusalādharmā sāsavā ca kusalā kusalānaṃdhammānaṃ vipākā ye ca dhammākiriya nevakusalā nākusalā na ca kaammavipākā sabbañcarūpaṃ – idaṃ vuccati dukkhaṃ*

<sup>8</sup> *Yāvata bhikkhave dhammā saṅkhatā ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo tesam aggaṃakkhāyati.*