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**A COMPARATIVE READING INTO THE EARLY BUDDHIST AND
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Abstract

The studies produced related to the epistemological foundation of early Buddhism whose literature is extant in the Pali Language, have reached the conclusion that Buddhism is similar to empiricism. For example, K. N. Jayatilleke in his *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1963, p.463) and D. J. Kalupahana in his work, *Buddhist Philosophy* (University Press of Hawaii, 1976, p.22f) have stated that early Buddhism is a form of empiricism. It is an academically interesting task to examine this suggestion from a comparative perspective when we consider one of the initiatives of an empiricist in the western history of philosophy, John Locke (1632-1704) in comparison with the early Buddhist theory of knowledge. Both Lockean and Early Buddhist traditions deny 'innate ideas' and accept the inevitability of sense-experience as the initial step in the process of forming knowledge. However, early Buddhism sees 'innate tendencies' as a critical aspect of the human psyche and does not claim sense-experience as an infallible source of knowledge. Early Buddhism oriented toward gaining liberation from suffering, recognizes extra-sensory perception and higher forms of knowledge gained through meditational practice, as means to realize the truth of reality.

In this paper, I am going to discuss the similarities and dissimilarities we can find in the Lockean theory of knowledge in comparison with the early Buddhist theory of knowledge. In conclusion, I will point out that though early Buddhism shows certain characteristics similar to Lockean empiricism, it differs greatly in its account as to the aspects such as sources of knowledge, purpose of bringing forth epistemological views and variety of levels of knowledge. Finally, it will be pointed out that the Lockean theory of knowledge is aimed at settling secular issues and takes a more philosophical approach whereas early Buddhism is aimed at attaining liberating knowledge from the cyclic suffering (*saṃsāra dukkha*) and takes a psychological approach in its theory of knowledge.

Keywords

Early Buddhism, sense-experience, innate ideas, innate tendencies, extra-sensory perception (*abhiññā*), *dukkha*, John Locke, sensation, reflection

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Introduction

Buddhism as preserved in the Pali *Nikāya* texts and Chinese *Āgamas* is known as early Buddhism. It is accepted by most scholars as the closest form to the original teachings of the Buddha. Some Buddhist scholars versed in Pali Buddhism have concluded that epistemologically early Buddhism is a form of empiricism. This claim has been subjected to criticism¹ and has opened space to look into early Buddhism from various forms of empirical theories on a comparative basis. So, in this paper, to compare with early Buddhism, I have selected the epistemology of John Locke (1632-1704), the first empiricist philosopher belonging to the early modern period of British empiricism, which was dominant during the seventeenth century. Having denied the rationalist view of 'innate ideas' as the source of knowledge, Locke attempted to establish his theory of knowledge on experience. His main objective was to construct a philosophical theory of knowledge. In this attempt, he analyses the external objects and certain processes in the mind to understand how knowledge is formed. Early Buddhism, being a set of teachings that provides a path to liberation from worldly suffering, emphasizes the cultivation of correct knowledge as a means to get emancipation. And it analyses both psychological and physical entities as a means to arrive at the truth. In this paper, I intend to compare the epistemological background of early Buddhism with Lockean empiricism in order to discover the fundamental differences between them and consequently to examine the validity of the claim that early Buddhism is a form of empiricism.

Backgrounds of Buddhism and Locke

It is useful to know the epistemological backgrounds on which early Buddhism and Lockean empiricism arose. In the Buddha's time, those who claimed to have arrived at knowledge and truth belonged to three epistemological groups. According to the Pali *Nikāyas*, they were traditionalists (*anussavika*-who based themselves on the authority of scriptures), rationalists and metaphysicians (*takki-vīmaṃsi*), and those who claimed direct personal knowledge.² The Buddha identifies himself with the third class of thinkers.³ In many places in the *Nikāyas*, we can find reference to direct personal knowledge by the Buddha (*jānaṃ jānāmi, passaṃ passami*)⁴. Through the refutation of sole dependence on authority (*śruti*)⁵ and reason, the Buddha invites people to exercise one's own capacity to find the truth (*attanāva jāneyyātha*).

By the seventeenth century, European philosophy was influenced by Platonic rationalism and this demanded the acceptance of certain ideas as truth without question and assumed that those ideas were originally impressed in our mind by God. Locke did not accept this dogmatism and his position was that God has given us reason to be exercised before accepting anything.

Thus, we can see that both early Buddhism and Locke were not willing to accept any concept merely based on authority.

Purpose of Locke vs. Early Buddhism

It is useful to know the purpose of Locke as compared to early Buddhism in the respective attempts to show how knowledge is derived. First, early Buddhism aimed at attaining liberation from worldly suffering. Once the Buddha mentioned that his search was for the purpose of seeking freedom from birth, death etc. and reaching sublime peace.⁶ In order to realize the truth of the phenomenal world, one needs to develop knowledge, but knowledge is not the final goal and it is only a means to liberation (*nissaraṇatthāya*).⁷

As Locke mentions in his work, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, his objective was to establish a theory of knowledge, which is philosophical.⁸ First, Locke had to lay the foundation in formation of his theory of knowledge by repudiating other competing theories of the knowledge. In proving the inadequacy of the contemporary theories of knowledge, Locke used his mastery of the scientific method of Isaac Newton. From the reference given in the *Essay*, we can understand that the discussion of knowledge in the Lockean account and that of early Buddhism take different directions, the former being secular while the latter is supra-mundane.

Locke's Empirical Thesis

In order to establish human understanding of experience, Locke had first to repudiate the doctrine of 'innate ideas' as the source of human knowledge. According to this rationalist view of the origin of knowledge, there are certain principles impressed in our minds even before we come to this world.⁹ Descartes and Leibniz were proponents of this theory. Following the Platonic view, they emphasized the inborn truths as the only truths and they denied the validity of experience and experiment. In contrast to this idea, Locke pointed out both in the speculative and moral spheres of knowledge, there are no innate principles with which every human being agrees.¹⁰

If knowledge does not come from innate ideas, then the question arises as to where it comes from. The answer to this question by Locke was 'experience'. Here experience means sense-experience. Experience is made up of sensation and reflection.¹¹ According to Locke, mind is a white paper (*tabula rasa*) and it is provided with ideas through sensation and reflection. Primarily, our senses come into contact with sense-objects which have the power to produce sensation. And sensation generates perception of the qualities in objects. The mind is passive in the reception of sense-data and it has no power to alter them. It is like a mirror that merely reflects what falls upon it.¹² Having been impressed by sense-objects, mind operates on them and generates the ideas like willing, believing etc. and this function is called reflection. As Locke says, there is no idea whatsoever that was not touched by sensation and reflection.¹³ Thus, Locke establishes his empirical thesis as the source of knowledge.

Sense Experience in Early Buddhism

Early Buddhism has accepted the role of sense-perception as vital in the human

person. The cognitive modes of perception (*saññā*) and sense-awareness (*viññāṇa*) represent the process of sense experience.¹⁴ The standard description of sense-experience has occurred in a discussion which accounts for the arising of different views (*ditthi*). The Pali reference to sense perception runs as:

Depending upon the visual organ and the visible object, O monks, arises visual *consciousness*; the meeting together of these three is *contact*; conditioned by contact arises *feeling*. What one feels one *perceives*; what one perceives, one reflects about; what one reflects about, one is obsessed with. What one is obsessed with, due to that, concepts characterized by such obsessed perceptions assail him in regard to visible objects cognizable by the visual organ, belonging to the past, the future, and the present.¹⁵

According to this reference, the process of sense-experience consists of several stages. The initial step is the contact of internal senses with their external objects which give rise to bare awareness (*viññāṇa*).¹⁶ Following the *viññāṇa*, there arises *contact* (familiarity)¹⁷ and in turn, contact leads to *feeling* (*vedanā*). Feeling is a crucial stage in this process since 'what one feels one perceives (*yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti*)'.

A notable characteristic in the Buddhist account of sense-perception is the element of emotion. The familiarity of the cognitive awareness gives rise to feeling (sensation); what one perceives is what one feels. Sensation gives rise to perception. This is a point where the early Buddhist account and that of Locke on sense-experience show a difference. As Locke puts the account of sensation:

Our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind, several distinct *Perceptions* of things, according to those various ways, wherein those Objects do affect them...I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those *Perceptions*.¹⁸

Locke directly comes to the process of perception through the stages of contact between external objects with sense organs and consequent sensation. But in the Buddhist account, before the perception occurs, the perceptual process has to pass the stages of the meeting of the senses with the object, bare consciousness, contact conditioned by the union of the internal sense with the sense-object and bare-consciousness, which produces feeling, and then, finally there is perception. Moreover, according to Locke, the powers of qualities generate ideas through sensation leading to perception.¹⁹ In contrast, Buddhism does not attribute priority to sense objects and the primary awareness is dependent on the simultaneous meeting between sense and object (depending upon the visual organ and the visible object, O monks, arises visual consciousness). By not emphasizing the external object, as D. J. Kalupahana points out, early Buddhism denies the concept of mind as '*tabula rasa*'.²⁰

The second source of knowledge in Lockean epistemology is reflection. Its role is to perceive the operations of mind over data provided through sensation. The ideas of perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing etc. come from reflection.²¹

The latter part of the above Pali *Nikāya* reference is concerned with the process of thinking that takes place after perception. Perception leads to more complicated stages of reflection (*vitakka*) and obsession (*papañca*). When the person is assailed with proliferation of concepts, he is governed by them. In the Buddhist account of sense perception (both sensation and reflection), what has been aimed at is to show how the person is obsessed with his own concepts.

In the early Buddhist literature, there are different modes of knowledge like *saññā*, *viññāṇa*, *paññā*, *pariññā* and *abhiññā*.²² Both '*saññā*' and '*viññāṇa*' are considered as ordinary cognitive modes. The concept of *viññāṇa* in the context of ordinary cognition, is considered as functioning to provide raw materials for perception. The difference between *saññā* and *viññāṇa* is shown pointing out that the former differentiates colours²³ and the latter differentiates sensations.²⁴ In the early texts, *viññāṇa* is considered as contributory to human suffering, so it has to be well understood (*pariññeyyam*).²⁵ In early Buddhism, the knowledge that comes through sensation and reflection is classified under ordinary knowledge and such forms of knowledge are considered as problematic knowing modes for the individual. In contrast, Locke's view is that they are reliable sources of knowledge.

Extra-sensory Perception in Early Buddhism

The concept of *abhiññā* which is pointed out as the epistemological foundation of early Buddhism is classified as extra-sensory knowledge. The word '*abhiññā*' is defined as special super-normal power of apperception and knowledge to be acquired by long training in life and thought.²⁶ And this knowledge becomes six-fold. The Buddha²⁷ and some of his disciples are said to have achieved them all.²⁸

The prefix *abhi* signifies in this context 'superiority', 'specialty', 'extraordinariness' and 'greatness'. Therefore, it can be said that *abhiññā* signifies a kind of super-cognition. Then, the question arises as to their nature and content. Their nature can be understood through the consideration of forms of knowing referred to as *abhiññā*. There are six forms of such knowledge. They are:

1. Psychokinesis (*iddhividha*)
2. Clairaudience (*dibbasotadhātu*)
3. Telepathic knowledge (*cetopariyañāṇa*)
4. Retrocognitive knowledge (*pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa*)
5. Clairvoyance (*cutūpapātañāṇa*)
6. Knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses (*āsavakkhayañāṇa*)

With the exception of *āsavakkhayañāṇa*, other types of super cognition were common to all those who practiced mental training. It was considered as a by-product of ‘mental-concentration’ (*samādhi*) in *jhāna* or yoga. Buddhism recognizes a causal relationship between mental concentration and the emergence of those cognitive abilities. K.N. Jayatilleke points out that even though the Upanishads also have referred to such super cognitions, they differ from Buddhism. According to him, the Upanishads conceived of this knowledge as a mystical form of intuitive knowledge, whereas the Buddha offers a causal explanation for the arising of such knowledge. Buddhism speaks of the possibility of human super-cognitive ability without mystifying such a natural capacity in the human psyche.²⁹ In the Upanishads, such knowledge was considered as what reveals metaphysical substances such as *ātman* or *Brahman*. An examination of the concept of *abhiññā* shows that there is no reference to such entities in Buddhism.

A special characteristic seen in Buddhism is the requirement of physical senses to gain extra-sensory perceptions. For example, to gain clairvoyance, one needs to possess the physical eye as its natural causal basis. According to the text *Itivuttaka*, the presence of the physical eye (*maṃsacakkhu*) is necessary for clairvoyance (*dibbacakkhu*).³⁰ In another place in the Pali canon, physical eye has been mentioned as the causal ground for clairvoyance.³¹

Except the knowledge, *āsavakkhayañāṇa*, all the other forms of knowledge mentioned above do not qualitatively differ from the content of ordinary sense-experience and the introspective experience of the mind, and the genuineness of a claim to possess such a capacity could in principle be tested even by someone who does not possess those powers of cognition.

Ideas as Content of Knowledge

The contents of knowledge, ideas, have been subjected to a subtle analysis by Locke. An idea is defined as whatever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks.³² The major division of ideas is into simple ideas and complex ideas. The simple ideas come from both sensation and reflection. Examples of the simple ideas of sensation are the coldness, whiteness, and hardness of a piece of ice. This class of simple ideas comes through only one sense. There is another class of simple ideas which we receive through two senses, for example, extension, figure, rest, and motion. These are perceivable impressions both on eyes and touch; and we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of extension, figure, motion, and rest of bodies both by seeing and feeling.³³

There is a class of simple ideas that comes through reflection, principally ideas of perception or thinking, and volition or willing.³⁴ The other class of simple ideas comes through both sensation and reflection: pleasure, pain, power, existence and unity. Ideas of pleasure or pain accompany almost all ideas, both of sensation and reflection.³⁵ Thus, we can see that there are four kinds of simple ideas and the common characteristic of them is that they are received by the mind passively. Moreover, these ideas cannot be altered by the mind.³⁶

The mind frames the complex ideas using the simple ideas as material. We can combine two or more simple ideas into one complex idea. Here we are not confined to bare observation and introspection, but we can voluntarily combine the data of sensation and reflection to form new ideas, each of which can be considered as one thing and given one name. Such are, for example, beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, and the universe.³⁷ By using the simple ideas of whiteness, sweetness, and hardness we form the complex idea of sugar.

In the early Buddhist literature, we cannot find such a detailed explanation about the contents of knowledge, or the ideas filling the mind. However, the concept of *saññā* (idea) can be related to the simple ideas which represent ideas or concepts of the external world through both sensation and reflection. In the discourse named *Mahāvedallasutta*, *saññā* is explained as the activity of 'cognizing in the *saññā* way'.³⁸ The instances given of such cognition refer specifically to the perception of colour.

What does one cognize in the 'saññā-way'? One cognizes...blue...yellow...red...and... white?

One could conjecture that *saññā* in this context implies the concept-forming procedure associated with perceptual activity as well as the natural tendency of the human mind to recognize the data given to the various senses in terms of concepts. *Saññā* could be taken as a stage beyond the bare excitement of the sensitivity of the sense-organs.

The activity of *saññā* seems to depend on repeated perceptual experience as well as the mind's ability to formulate abstract ideas and recognize the sensory environment in terms of such ideas. *Saññā* could therefore be seen as that which provides material for thought. That which one knows in the *saññā* way is that which one thinks about (*yaṃ sañjānāti, taṃ vitakketi*).

In perceiving the external sense-sphere, early Buddhism does not separate the colour, shape etc. All the sense objects are divided into six groups corresponding to their internal senses.³⁹ Form is the object of eye and colour and shape etc. are included in the form itself. And there is no attempt to recognize them as distinct ideas. Especially, in the Lockean account, the description of complex ideas finds no parallel in early Buddhism. Putting two or three simple ideas together we form a complex idea. Sugar is the complex idea of adding the simple ideas of whiteness, sweetness and hardness. In early Buddhism, there is no such a view that consciousness synthesizes the concepts to form another concept.

Contents of Super Cognition

It is interesting to know the nature of the content of knowledge that is gained through extra-sensory perception as given in early Buddhist texts. In this case, Buddhist scholars like K.N. Jayatilleke and P.D. Premasiri maintain that the super cognitions have an empirical basis and no mystic contents as such.⁴⁰ As it was mentioned above, to achieve something like clairaudience (*dibbasota*) and clairvoyance (*dibbacakkhu*), one should possess unimpaired physical sense

organs. According to early texts, the enlightenment consists of three knowledges (*tevijjā*), the knowledge of previous existences (*pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa*), the knowledge of death and rebirth of sentient beings (*cutūpapātañāṇa*), and the knowledge of destruction of cankers (*āsavakkhayañāṇa*). *Pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa* is not a direct perception of the past but extension of the memory, which is indicated by the term '*satānusāriviññāṇa*'. The knowledge of passing away and rebirth of other beings is (*cutūpapātañāṇa*) which is a special application of clairvoyance and it sees contemporaneous events but not future events. The last knowledge, *āsavakkhayañāṇa* which is considered the highest and unique to Buddhism, is normally interpreted as verification of four truths of suffering, its origin, its cessation, and way to cessation, the understanding of the three characteristics of being (impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, and non-substantiality), and the comprehension of the law of cause and effect (*paṭiccasamuppāda*). So, *āsavakkhayañāṇa* is understood first as knowledge which results in the elimination of cankers and second as the introspective knowledge of one's liberated condition of mind.

It is obvious that there is no concept of extra-sensory perception and enlightenment in the Lockean system as found in early Buddhism. The important difference is that Locke has not referred to an internal transformation through the knowledge gained either through sensation or reflection.

Substance

Through the analysis of the process relating to the way we form knowledge, Locke finds that there should be a support for the ideas that impress upon mind through sensation and ideas formed through reflection. This support is known as 'substance' or substratum. This is unchangeable. This substratum is hidden in the changing phenomena.⁴¹ As Locke states, through the a priori methods of intuition and demonstration we can get ideas of real essences, and the knowledge of essences is "certain and universal knowledge"⁴². In the analysis of knowledge, his conclusion about substance is that it cannot be known. This idea of substance by Locke forms a contrast with the early Buddhist understanding of the phenomenal world.

According to early Buddhist understanding, the material objects are composed of four elements, earth, water, fire, and wind. These are not considered as unchangeable substances but as being mutually dependent. They are also not things unknowable but can be understood through their characteristics.⁴³ The conditioned world is characterized by change (impermanent-*anicca*), unsatisfactoriness (*dukkha*) and non-substantiality (*anatta*). This indicates that in the conditioned world there is nothing unchangeable (*aniccā vata saṅkhārā*).

Conclusion

From the discussion we can derive significant differences and similarities between the early Buddhist account with regard to knowledge and Lockean

empiricism. Both early Buddhist and Lockean theories of knowledge were constructed with respect to previously formulated epistemological backgrounds. When the Buddha arose, there were three groups of epistemological thinkers who respectively relied on the authority of religious scriptures, reason and direct personal knowledge. The Buddha claimed that he belonged to the third group. The Buddha did not accept mere dependence on scriptures or reason as effective ways to find the truth. By the time of Locke, the Platonic view of innate principles as the basis for true knowledge was influential in the context of epistemology in the west and he saw it as a sort of hindrance to the exercise of reason which is free from dogmatic views. Early Buddhism agrees with Locke with his denial of innate principles but early Buddhism accepts the influence of innate tendencies in receiving sense-data and in turn denies the 'tabula rasa' theory.

Locke established his theory of knowledge based on experience, which is composed of sensation and reflection. Early Buddhism accepts sense-experience as a source of knowledge but it does not accept that the mind is passive in receiving sense data. Moreover, Locke has not provided a detailed account as to how sensation occurs. Early Buddhism has been more explanatory and perception is seen as intermixed with feeling. The reference to the element of feeling before perception is a crucial difference between early Buddhism and Locke.

While early Buddhism accepts sensation and reflection as sources of knowledge, it advocates them as contributory to suffering since they lead the individual into obsession with concepts. But for Locke they are reliable sources of knowledge. Through them, one can get to the ideas of essences of objects. As for Buddhism, they cause psychological obsession and consequently are contributory to suffering. Moreover, Buddhism accepts a variety of knowledge modes which can be achieved through mental cultivation.

The contents of knowledge, ideas in Lockean theory and the concept of 'saññā' (ideas) in early Buddhism bear similarity as the material for thinking. That is, complex ideas are a result of putting two or more ideas together by reflection. Early Buddhism has not accepted that sort of process in mind. The variety of sense-data is determined by the sense through which the objects reach the mind. In addition, knowledge comes through sense-experience and reflection,

Through the analysis of knowledge, Locke concludes that there is a support from which ideas of objects flow out. This support is called substance or substratum and it lies unchanged behind the changing phenomena. It is also unknowable. Early Buddhism does not accept any sort of unchanging substance lying behind the phenomenal objects and every object is a collection of elements which are interdependent and without any permanent substance.

Finally, it should be mentioned that early Buddhism is in agreement with the fundamental character of Lockean empiricism, sense experience as the source of knowledge but it does not rely on it in the process of gaining the truth about

suffering. Locke has paid attention to building a theory of knowledge whereas early Buddhism sees knowledge as a means to get rid of mental propensities like greed, hatred and ignorance and in turn getting liberation from suffering. The analysis of knowledge by Locke is concerned with the phenomenal world whereas early Buddhism analyses the psychological characteristics in its explanation concerning human suffering. The conclusion we can reach is that, although early Buddhism accords with empirical analysis even in the context of extra-sensory knowledge, it has differed from the Lockean empiricism by following a different direction and also significantly varying method of mental cultivation and analysis of mental phenomena. So, the claim that early Buddhism is a form of empiricism needs further qualifications.

Abbreviations

- M. *Majjhimanikāya*
A. *Aṅguttaranikāya*
S. *Samyuttanikāya*

Endnotes

- ¹ Jayatilleke, K. N., 1963: p. 463 and Kalupahana, D. J., 1976: p.22 have recognized Buddhism as a form of empiricism whereas Hoffman, F. J., 2002: p.99 has rejected the claim that early Buddhism is a form of empiricism.
- ² M. V (ed.), 1951: p. 211
K. N. Jayatilleke, *op.cit* : p.171
- ³ His denial of former two is mentioned in the *Kāḷāmasutta*
A. I (ed.), 1989: p.188
- ⁴ MN I (ed.), 1951: p.111
- ⁵ A I (ed.), 1989: p.188
- ⁶ M I (ed.), 1993: p.162
- ⁷ Bhikkhu Nanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi (trans.), 1995: p. 228
- ⁸ References of this paper are based on the edition of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990 (repri). *Essay* I.i.2:43: my *Purpose* to enquire into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of human Knowledge; together, with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent
- ⁹ *Essay* I.II.5:48 : It is an established Opinion amongst some Men, That there are in the understanding certain innate principles; some primary notions, Characters, as it were stamped upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very first Being; and brings into the world with it.
- ¹⁰ *Essay* I.II.4:p, 49 Because there are none to which all Mankind give an Universal Assent.
- ¹¹ *Essay* I.II.2:p. 104 Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, From *Experience*: In that, all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself.
- ¹² *Essay* II.I.25: p. 118
- ¹³ *Essay* II.I.24: p. 117
- ¹⁴ Premasiri, P. D. , 2006: pp. 135-137
- ¹⁵ M II (ed.), 1994: pp. 111-112

- ¹⁶ The term *viññāṇa* has different meanings and in this context it stands for the concept Cognitive awareness: William S. Waldron, *The Buddhist Unconscious*, London:RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p.28 fn.45; P. D. Premasiri interprets ‘*viññāṇa*’ in the context above as ‘the perceptual awareness of the respective senses prior to conceptualization, and therefore, that it supplies raw data for the growth of concepts and the psychological activity referred to by the term *sañjānāti*. See : P. D. Premasiri, *op.cit.*: p.163
- ¹⁷ Kalupahana, D. J. , 1994: p.33
- ¹⁸ Essay II.I.3: p. 105
- ¹⁹ Yolton, J. W., 1993: p.199
- ²⁰ Kalupahana D. J., *op.cit.*: p. 32
- ²¹ *Essay II.I.4*: p. 105: The other fountain, from which Experience furnisheth the Understanding with Ideas, is the *Perception of the Operations of our own Minds* within us, as it is employ’d about the *Ideas* it has got; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on, and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of Ideas, which could not be had from things without: and such are, *Perception, Thinking, Doubting, Believing, Reasoning, Knowing, Willing*, and all the different actings of our own minds...This source of *Ideas*...I call Reflection, the ideas it affords being such only, as the mind gets by reflecting on its own Operations within itself
- ²² Premasiri, P. D., *op.cit.*: pp.154-177
- ²³ Bhikkhu Nanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, *op.cit.*: p.389
What does it perceive? It perceives blue...yellow...red...and white.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*,: p. 388
What does it cognize? It cognizes: [This is] pleasant...painful...neither painful-nor-pleasant.
- ²⁵ It is interesting to compare this with the position that early Buddhism maintained with regard to ‘*taṇhā*-(craving)-the origin of suffering’.
- ²⁶ Rhys Davids and W. Stede, 2003(reprint): p. 642
- ²⁷ *M*, (ed.) V, 1993: p. 69
- ²⁸ *S*, (ed.) II, 1994: p. 217
- ²⁹ Jayatilleke, K.N, 2008: p.420
- ³⁰ *mamsacakkhussa uppādo maggo dibbassacakkhuno Itivuttaka*: p.52
- ³¹ *Milindapañha*: p.119
- ³² *Essay*, I.I.8:47
It being the Term, which, I think, serves best to understand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks, I have used to express whatever is meant by Phantasm, Notion, Species, or whatever it is, which the Mind can be employ’d about in thinking; E.II.viii.8:134: whatsoever the Mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of Perception, Thought, or Understanding, that I call Idea
- ³³ *Essay II.V.1*: p. 127
- ³⁴ *Essay II.VI.1*:p. 127
- ³⁵ *Essay II.VII.1*: p. 128
- ³⁶ *Essay II.II.2*: p. 119
- ³⁷ *Essay II.XII.1*: p. 163
- ³⁸ “*sañjānāti sañjānāti ti kho avuso tasmā saññāti vuccati*”
M V (ed.), 1993: p. 293
- ³⁹ *S IV* (ed.) 1994: p. 15 mind-ideas
- ⁴⁰ Jayatilleke, K.N., 2008: pp.417-427
Premasiri, P. D. *op.cit.*,: pp.144-146

⁴¹ Copleston, F., 2003: p.94

⁴² Essay IV.XII.10: p. 645

⁴³ *MI* (ed.), 1993: pp. 422-423

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